The progress on governing REDD+ in Indonesia by Santosa, Mas Achmad et al.
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
2013 Special Edition    International Journal of Rural Law and Policy 
REDD+ and the legal regime of mangroves, peatlands and other wetlands: ASEAN and the world 
THE PROGRESS ON GOVERNING 
REDD+ IN INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mas Achmad Santosa 
Deputy Head 
Presidential Delivery Unit for  
Development Monitoring & Oversight 
Head of Working Group 
Legal Review and Law Enforcement 
REDD+ Task Force 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia is one of the ten most forest-rich countries in the world. Almost 70 per cent 
of Indonesia’s mainland is covered with forest. However, Indonesia faces one of the 
highest rates of forest loss in the world. Deforestation and forest degradation ac-
counts for more than 60 per cent of carbon emissions in Indonesia. Being aware of 
that fact and the danger of climate change, in October 2009, Indonesia voluntarily 
committed to reduce emissions by 26 per cent from business as usual by 2020 through 
national efforts, and by 41 per cent with international support. Indonesia’s commit-
ment has gained international support; chiefly from Norway, which signed a Letter of 
Intent on 26 May 2010. 
To formalise the commitment, Presidential Decree No 19/2010 on Task Force for the 
preparation of REDD+ Agency and Presidential Instruction No 10/2011 on moratorium 
on new licenses and improvement of natural primary forest and peat land governance 
have been issued. The Presidential Decree ended on 30 June 2011 and was continued 
by Presidential Decree No 25/2011, which was later amended by Presidential Decree 
No 05/2013. The third Presidential Decree will conclude in the middle of 2013. The 
expected outputs are: establishment of a New REDD+ agency; measurement, reporting 
and verification instrument; funding instrument; improvement on forest governance, 
including legislative reform, law enforcement and administrative procedures; and ga-
zetting forest areas and consolidating licenses through legal audit and legal 
compliance or legal due diligence in the pilot province. The new REDD+ Agency is ex-
pected to be established in 2013. The Agency will be an independent central agency, 
directly responsible to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, and will be respon-
sible for leading and coordinating the national effort to reduce the country’s carbon 
emission. 
Background 
Indonesia has a significant role to play in reducing carbon emissions from forests and peatlands, not only be-
cause of the size of these areas in the country, but also because the rate of degradation of the two important 
ecosystem is worrying. 
Indonesia’s forest areas cover more than 130 million ha,1 or around 70 per cent of the land area, making Indo-
nesia one of the countries with the most rainforest cover in the world. From 2003 to 2006, the rate of 
deforestation was around 1.17 million ha/year. From 2009 to 2011, the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry declared 
that the rate of deforestation reduced to 0.45 million ha/year.2 The rate of deforestation in Indonesia, there-
fore, shows signs of decreasing, but it is still alarmingly high. 
                                                        
1	  	  Ministry	  of	  Forestry,	  Forestry	  Statistics	  of	  Indonesia,	  2011.	  
2	  	  Minister	  of	  Forestry,	  Ministry	  of	  Forestry	  Regulation	  No	  P.37/Menhut-­‐II/2012	  on	  Ministry	  Forestry	  Working	  Plan	  2013.	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In the 1990s, both Indonesia and Brazil had the highest net loss of forest in the world.3 A significant cause of 
forest loss in Indonesia was influenced by the El Nino Southern Oscillation in 1997–1998, when severe fires 
burnt over 9.7 million ha of the country’s forests. This forest grew on peatlands and, in terms of carbon emis-
sions, made the impact on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions worse.4 Peatlands contain more carbon than forests 
do.5 Indonesia has around 21 million ha of peatlands (around 83% of Southeast Asia’s peatlands), with 42 per 
cent containing peat greater than two meters deep.6 Activities under the land use, land-use change and forest-
ry (LULUCF) inventory sector include peat fires as the largest contributor to GHG emissions in Indonesia. Such 
fires contribute around 60 per cent of total national GHG emissions.7 Interest in introducing REDD+ (Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus) projects in Indonesia is high. Implementing REDD+ 
has become one of the most popular plans to help meet Indonesia's commitment to voluntarily reduce emis-
sions by 2020 from business as usual levels by 26 per cent using domestic efforts and up to 41 per cent with 
international assistance. 
Emissions from deforestation as well as from forests and peatland degradation are basically triggered by gov-
ernance issues such as ineffective spatial planning, poor tenure rules, ineffective forest management regimes 
and poor law enforcement.8 
The national strategy of REDD+ in Indonesia has two main foci: enhancement of forest and peatland governance 
and development of the infrastructure of REDD+. Infrastructure development includes the establishment of the 
REDD+ Agency; a funding instrument; and a measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) institution. This 
paper will discuss both foci with emphasis on the first aspect of providing forest and peatland governance. The 
first section of this paper provides the background to the REDD+ issue in Indonesia. The second section discuss-
es the Indonesian laws and policies framework that support REDD+, and is followed by an explanation of the 
development of REDD+ infrastructures. The paper concludes with an outline of the program to enhance forest 
and peatland governance and its progress. 
Laws and policies framework to support REDD+ 
GoI commitment, LoI and REDD+ Task Force 
Preparation for the institutionalisation of REDD+ in Indonesia was expedited when the Indonesian President 
committed the Indonesian Government (Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoI)) to emissions reduction 
measures at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh in 2009. 
We are devising an energy mix policy including LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry) 
that will reduce our emissions by 26 per cent by 2020 from BAU (Business As Usual). With internation-
al support, we are confident that we can reduce emissions by as much as 41 per cent. This target is 
entirely achievable because most of our emissions come from forest related issues, such as forest 
fires and deforestation.
9 
This commitment invited support from various parties. The Government of the Kingdom of Norway (Norway) 
provided a Letter of Intent (LoI) in 2010 through which Indonesia receives support from Norway to prepare 
institutions and rules for the implementation of REDD+ schemes. 
                                                        
3  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States, Global Forest Resources Assessment, 2010. 
4  G Applegate et al, ‘Forest Fires in Indonesia: Impacts and Solutions’ (CIFOR and ISEAS, 2002). 
5  Kevin Black and Gerhard Gallagher, The Greenhouse Gas Balance of Peatland Forest (Coford Connects, 2010) 
<http://www.woodenergy.ie/media/woodenergy/content/publicationsreports/The%20 green-
house%20gas%20balance%20of%20peatland%20forest.pdf>.  
6  A Hooijer et al, ‘Peat-CO2: Assessment of CO2 Emissions from Drained Peatlands in SE Asia’ (Delft Hydraulics report 
Q3943/2006, 2006). See also, Wahyunto and I Nyoman N Suryadiputra, ‘Peatland Distribution in Sumatra and Kalimantan –
Explanation of its Data Sets Including Source Information, Accuracy, Data Constraints and Gaps’(Wetlands International, 
2008) <http://www.wetlands.or.id/PDF/Atlas%20Review.pdf>. 
7  Rizaldi Boer et al, ‘Indonesia Second National Communication Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change’ (Ministry of Environment, November 2010) <http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/non-
annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/application/pdf/indonesia_snc.pdf>. 
8  REDD+ Task Force, ‘Draft REDD+ National Strategy’ (Jakarta, Indonesia, 2011)	  <http://www.ukp.go.id/informasi-
publik/cat_view/21-redd>;	  See also, UNDP and UN-REDD+ Programme, Participatory Governance Assessment: The 2012 
Indonesia Forest, Land and REDD+ Governance Index (UNDP Indonesia, 2013) 
<http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=3004&Itemid=53>. 
9  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Intervention by H E Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President of the Republic of Indonesia on 
Climate Change’ (Intervention at the G-20 Leaders Summit, Pittsburgh, US, 25 September 2009) 
<http://forestclimatecenter.org/files/2009-09-25%20Intervention%20by%20President%20SBY%20on%20 
Climate%20Change%20at%20the%20G-20%20Leaders%20Summit.pdf>.  
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Responding to Norway’s support, the Indonesian Government issued Presidential Decree No 19/2010 on the 
Establishment of the Task Force for the Preparation of a REDD+ Agency. The Task Force’s term ended on 30 
June 2011. The results of this first REDD+ Task Force include the REDD+ National Strategy, Presidential Instruc-
tion No. 10/2011 on Suspension of New Licenses and Improving Governance of Primary Forest and Peatland 
(‘Presidential Instruction on Moratorium Phase I’), and the selection and preparation of Central Kalimantan as 
a pilot province for a REDD+ program in Indonesia. Presidential Decree No 25/2011, which was then amended 
by Presidential Decree No 5/2013 on the New Task Force. This ended on 30 June 2013. The mandate for the 
new Task Force was to establish a REDD+ agency; a funding instrument; and a measurement, reporting and 
verification (MRV) institution; as well as to oversee the implementation of Presidential Instruction on Morato-
rium Phase I, which was the basis of the Task Force initiatives to develop and coordinate programs to improve 
forest and peatland governance. 
The national action plan to reduce GHGs emission 
Following the Indonesian President’s commitment in Pittsburgh, Presidential Regulation No 61/2011 on Nation-
al Action Plan to Reduce Green House Gasses (GHGs) Emission (‘Presidential Regulation on GHGs Reduction’) 
was enacted. The Presidential Regulation on GHGs Reduction serves as a guideline for ministries, institutional 
agencies and regional governments to conduct planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in order to 
reduce emissions. The Presidential Regulation has two action-plan annexes that detail the targets and strate-
gies to reduce emissions in five main sectors: agriculture, forests and peatlands, energy and transportation, 
industry, and waste management. The first annex discusses the main action plan and the second one provides 
details of the supporting action plan. The program to establish REDD+ institutionalisation, the REDD+ national 
strategy, and the establishment of the MRV and funding instrument are specifically dealt with in the second 
annex.  
The Presidential Regulation on GHGs Reduction required all provinces to have a provincial action plan to re-
duce GHGs by 20 September 2012. To date, most provinces have complied.10 
Presidential instructions on suspension of new licenses 
On 20 May 2011, the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, issued Presidential Instruction on 
Moratorium Phase 1, which basically ordered relevant authorities to suspend new licenses/permits/concessions 
as shown on the Indicative Map on Suspension of New License (Peta Indikatif Penundaan Izin Baru (‘PIPIB’). The 
areas included in the PIPIB are primary natural forests and peatlands located both within and outside of forest 
areas that have not previously been given licenses/permits/concessions. Presidential Instruction on Moratori-
um Phase 1 is part of the agreement between GoI and Norway based on the LoI signed by both parties on 26 
May 2010. This is not the first forest moratorium policy issued by GoI. A previous moratorium has been estab-
lished in Aceh Province and Riau Province. However, the moratorium imposed by Presidential Instruction on 
Moratorium Phase 1 received widespread attention because it applied nationally and acknowledged the need 
to improve governance of forests and peatlands. 
The issue of Presidential Instruction on Moratorium Phase 1 is also important in the context of preparations for 
the implementation of REDD+. It accelerates the development of the REDD+ infrastructure as well as demon-
strating that efforts to improve governance of forests and peatlands is being given priority. Moreover, the 
Instruction has encouraged ministries and institutions to develop actions and programs to improve forests and 
peatlands governance, such as through the One Map Initiative/Movement (this Initiative is explained further 
below). 
The Presidential Instruction on Moratorium Phase 1 has mandated the Presidential Delivery Unit on Develop-
ment Oversight and Monitoring (Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan or 
UKP4)/REDD+ Task Force to supervise actions taken by relevant ministries and heads of regional governments. 
To emphasise the priority status of the governance issues, the President has extended the moratorium for a 
further two years by issuing Presidential Instruction No 6/2013 on Suspension of New Licences and Improving 
Governance of Primary Forest and Peatland. 
                                                        
10 By 19 December 2012, 27 Provinces had issued their Provincial Action Plant to Reduce GHG, see, Jurnas.com, 27 Provinsi 
Rampungkan Rencana Aksi Penurunan Emisi GRK (19 December 2012) <http://www.jurnas.com/news/78569/27_Provinsi_ 
Rampungkan_Rencana_Aksi_Penurunan_Emisi_GRK/1/Sosial_Budaya/Lingkungan>. 
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Beyond carbon: The national strategy on REDD+ 
‘Beyond carbon towards governance of forest and peatland that benefits public in the current and next genera-
tion’ is the message emphasised in the Indonesian National Strategy of REDD+ (Strategi Nasional REDD+). This 
emphasises that REDD+ is a strategy designed to achieve long-term goals, namely: a reduction of GHG emissions 
originating from LULUCF, an increase in carbon stocks, an improvement in the preservation of biodiversity, and 
economic growth. 
The strategy document is the result of extensive consultation with various stakeholders. It was initially devel-
oped and launched by the National Planning Agency in 2010, followed up by the Task Force, and finally issued 
in the Head of REDD+ Task Force Decree No 02/Satgas REDD+/09/2012.  
To achieve REDD+ strategic goals, the program framework consists of five inter-related pillars (illustrated in 
Figure 1):  
1. Institutionalisation and process 
2. Legal framework and regulations 
3. Strategic programs 
4. Changes to work paradigm and culture  
5. Inclusion/involvement of stakeholders  
Figure 1: The framework of national strategies based on five pillars  
National Action Plan for REDD+ 
The National Action Plan for REDD+ (‘REDD+ NAP’) is being prepared to provide more details for the implemen-
tation of the National Strategy, as mandated by the Decree of Head of REDD+ Task Force No REDD 02/SATGAS 
REDD PLUS/09/2012 on REDD+ National Strategy. Apart from REDD+ NAP at the national level, the National 
Strategy also requires that each province adopt a REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action Plan (PSAP) based on 
the REDD+ Strategy. 
The REDD+ NAP itself is being developed based on a series of consultations at the provincial level. To ensure a 
bottom-up process, programs that are part of REDD+ NAP must be those proposed at the provincial level 
Mas Santosa, Josi Khatarina and Aldilla Stephanie Suwana 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
2013 Special Edition    International Journal of Rural Law and Policy 
REDD+ and the legal regime of mangroves, peatlands and other wetlands: ASEAN and the world 
5 
through the PSAPs. Therefore, it is expected that the REDD+ NAP can be the technical document and the 
framework that shows how national and regional priorities to achieve the National Action Plan to reduce GHG 
emission (‘NAP GHG’) from forests and peatlands align.11 
Provincial strategies and action plans  
Individual PSAPs are required under the REDD+ National Strategy. They are plans for implementation of REDD+ 
that take into account the context and conditions of the province and are developed through an inclusive pro-
cess. A PSAP must be developed based on the REDD+ National Strategy and be supported by other planning 
documents such as a Medium Term Development Plan (‘Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menegah Daerah 
(‘RPJMD’)).12 This approach has been adopted to ensure that problems of implementation – an issue that has 
been acknowledged as often overlooked in Indonesian development plans, causing them to be ineffective – are 
considered during the planning phase.13  
In 2012, the Governor of Central Kalimantan, the province in which the REDD+ program is being piloted, issued 
Governor Regulation No 10/2012 on REDD+ Provincial Strategy (‘REDD+ Provincial Strategy in Central Kaliman-
tan Province’).14  The Governor of Central Sulawesi has similarly issued Governor Regulation No 40/2011 
(‘REDD+ Provincial Strategy in Central Sulawesi’).15 East Kalimantan, Riau, Jambi, West Sumatra and West 
Papua have finalised their PSAPs. Other provinces, namely: West Kalimantan, Papua, Aceh and South Sumatra, 
are preparing and/or finalising their PSAPs. 
REDD+ infrastructures 
Three REDD+ infrastructures: REDD+ Agency, funding instrument and MRV Institution, are required by the Pres-
idential Regulation on GHGs Reduction and the Presidential Decree on REDD+ Task Force. 
REDD+ Agency 
In the National Strategy on REDD+, the REDD+ Agency is required: to coordinate, oversee and accelerate im-
provements in forests and peatlands governance in the context of reducing the rate of deforestation and 
degradation; and ensure effective funding mechanisms and fair distribution of benefits of REDD+ projects in 
accordance with the integrity requirements for REDD+ implementation systems (safeguards).16 
The REDD+ Agency has been set up (i) as the designated national authority on REDD+ with strong governing 
functions, including authority to prepare regulatory frameworks for the implementation of REDD+ and to con-
trol the acceleration of improved forest and peatlands governance systems, (ii) to control the coordinating 
thematic functions and (iii) to execute strategic communications and stakeholder engagement effectively 
domestically and internationally.17 The REDD+ Agency carries out a number of different functions, including a 
steering function involving REDD+ policies; planning and implementing according to its established mandate; 
and a supervisory function that involves monitoring the implementation of REDD+ programs. It is expected that 
the head of the new agency will be appointed at a ministerial level and report directly to the President. 
In December 2012, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs was appointed by the Presi-
dent to coordinate discussions between the relevant Ministries and the REDD+ Task Force on the Draft 
Presidential Regulation on REDD+ Institution. The funding instrument and MRV Institution for REDD+ have been 
included in the Draft Presidential Regulation. 
Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) institution for REDD+ 
The MRV of a REDD+ activity/project/program provides the basis of ongoing funding for the activity/ 
project/program. In the National Strategy, the REDD+ Agency is tasked with facilitating the establishment of 
the MRV Agency. The MRV Agency is responsible for developing policies, standards and mechanism of MRV that 
                                                        
11 REDD+ Task Force, National Action Plan for the Implementation of REDD+, draft-3, December 2012. 
12 REDD+ Task Force, REDD+ National Strategy, June 2012. 
13 Interview with Prof Hariado Kartodihardjo, one of the authors of PSAP (Jakarta, 13 May 2013). 
14 REDD-I, Central Kalimantan Issued REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan, 15 May 2013 <http://www.redd-
indonesia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=462:kalteng-terbitkan-strategi-dan-rencana-aksi-
redd&catid=1:fokus-redd&Itemid=50, 22 May 2012>. 
15 Notwithstanding the issue of REDD+ provincial strategies in Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi Provinces, several 
steps still need to be taken by both provinces to bring their strategies up to REDD+ NAP’s standards and requirements. 
16 REDD+ Task Force, REDD+ National Strategy, June 2012. 
17 Ibid. 
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are in accordance with UNFCCC decisions. The MRV Agency operates independently and depends on the inter-
national community for verification of its measures. 
To take advantage of the potential development of a voluntary carbon market, verification by an accredited 
independent third party will also be necessary.18 Independently verified emissions reductions (VER) are im-
portant for the operation of the REDD+ scheme at the national and regional level as a basis of payments for the 
emissions offset achieved by project proponents. 
Funding instrument  
The REDD+ Agency is also tasked with facilitating the establishment of a REDD+ funding instrument, which is  
based on potential funding sources, potential users and multi-party governance. Particularly, the financial 
instrument should be established to: 
1. Support the development of REDD+’s programs/projects/activities in accordance with the potential for 
emissions reduction from forested lands and peatlands management. 
2. Provide a credible mechanism for channelling funds internationally for potential donors and investors 
who want to encourage and/or benefit from REDD+ programs/projects/activities. This mechanism will 
be administered by the Fund for REDD+ in Indonesia (FREDDI). Based upon consideration of different 
options, the best legally available scheme would be if FREDDI formed a trust fund that adopts the for-
mat of fund-of-funds,19 with principles set out under Government Regulation No 10/2011 on Foreign 
Loan and Grant Management and supplemented by Presidential Decree No 80/2011 on Trust Fund. 
3. Encourage efficiency in the utilisation of funds and the equitable distribution of the benefits of devel-
opment of REDD+ programs/projects. 
4. Ensure that implementation complies with the three elements of the safeguards framework namely: 
fiduciary, social and environmental responsibilities.20 
The funding instrument has a set of principles, criteria and indicators for the safeguards, known as PRISAI 
(Prinsip, Kriteria dan Indikator Safeguard REDD+ di Indonesia (Principles, Criteria, and Indicators for REDD+ 
Safeguards in Indonesia)). PRISAI incorporates existing standards, national and international legal frameworks 
and a participatory, bottom-up process involving various stakeholders. Implementation of PRISAI will ensure 
that REDD+ provides real and sustainable benefits to people, biodiversity and ecosystems, and supports im-
proved governance, as well as ensuring that REDD+ programs are effective and reduce the risk of non-
permanence. The challenge is to establish a world-class financing mechanism to channel international financial 
support. The design of the instrument needs to build in mechanisms for transparency, multi-stakeholder partic-
ipation covering a broad executing agency base and civil society, as well as including private sector 
involvement in due course.21 
Improving forests and peatlands governance: Prerequisite for REDD+ 
The high rate of forest and peatlands deforestation and degradation has been driven by poor forest govern-
ance.22 As already noted, the clear impact of poor forest governance on deforestation and degradation has led 
the President of the Republic of Indonesia to issue decrees which emphasise the importance of enhancing for-
est and peatlands governance. 
The assessment that forests and peatlands governance in Indonesia is poor is supported by findings carried out 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in collaboration with UN-REDD Program on participatory 
governance assessment (PGA). The findings from this research gave Indonesia’s Forest, Land and REDD+ Gov-
ernance a score of less than three on key aspects of governance,23 as shown in Figure 2. 
 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
19 The fund-of-funds is a mutual fund that invests in other mutual funds. 
20 REDD+ Task Force, REDD+ National Strategy, June 2012. 
21 REDD+ Task Force, Principles of Indonesian Safeguards Principles, Criteria and Indicators-PRISAI, version 001, 2012. 
22 REDD+ Task Force, REDD+ National Strategy, June 2012. See also, UNDP and UN-REDD+ Programme, Forest, Land and 
REDD+ 2012 Index in Indonesia (UNDP Indonesia, 2013) <http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_ 
docman&task=cat_view&gid=3004&Itemid=53>. 
23 UNDP and UN-REDD Programme, above n 22. 
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Figure 2: Forest, land and REDD+ PGA Index 
Note: Component A: Laws and regulations, Component B: Government Capacity, Component C: Citizen Capacity, Component 
D: Indigenous, Local and Women Capacity, Component E: Business Actor Capacity, and Component F: Performance. 
Three stages of forests and peatlands governance are discussed in this paper: planning, utilisation and supervi-
sion/law enforcement. Problems and some of the actions that have been initiated to tackle and/or improve the 
poor forests and peatlands governance system in Indonesia will also be discussed. 
Issues in forest and peatlands planning  
Lack of integrated forest and peatlands maps  
At present, each government ministry and sectoral institution at central government and regional level has its 
own map of forests and peatlands that serve their different purposes, including as a reference for issuing li-
censes/permits. The maps vary in scale and validity, and, in many cases do not necessarily mirror the situation 
in the field. Consequently, there are overlaps of licenses and claims over land. 
Different criteria of protected and productive areas between each sector 
A further complicating factor with the usefulness of the maps is the variation in the criteria used to designate 
protected areas and productive areas within and outside of forests. Within forest areas, three aspects should 
designate forest type: slope gradient, soils type and rainfall intensity.24 
The condition of peatlands has traditionally not been considered when designating forest status. There is ge-
neric regulation for protected areas under Law No 26/2007 on Spatial Planning (‘Spatial Planning Law’) that 
requires consideration of depth and position of peatlands25 occurring outside of forest areas. However, peat-
lands that are more than three metres deep and located within forest areas are usually designated as 
productive forest instead of as a protected area. For instance, in Padang Island, Riau Province, one corporation 
had been given a concession of 13.748 ha of peatlands that is more than three metres deep.26  
Discrepancy between designated forest planning and spatial planning  
To rectify the discrepancy in the maps, the new Spatial Planning Law requires a single spatial plan for both 
forest and non-forest areas. However, as of 8 March 2013, only 14 Provinces out of 34 have completed spatial 
plans,27 even though, by law, provincial spatial plans should have been completed by 26 April 2009.28 Similarly 
                                                        
24 Government Regulation No 44/2004 on Forestry Planning, art 24(3)b. 
25 Law No 26/2007 on Spatial Planning, explanation of art 5 para (2); and Presidential Decree No 32/1990 on Management of 
Protected Area, arts 3 and 4. 
26 REDD+ Task Force, ‘Legal Review and Law Enforcement’ (Working Group Report No 05/REDD+/PM/12, January 2012). 
27 There are 33 Provinces in Indonesia, see, Ministry of Public Works, Indonesia Spatial Plan Recapitulation Completion Pro-
gress (2013) <http://sikumtaru.penataanruang.net/view/template.asp?idtipeproduk=Lap& modul=5b1bcc01ae021 
b8e5f2be71432ab67ac>. 
28 Law No 26/2007 on Spatial Planning, art 78 para 4(b). 
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only 279 out of 491 municipal spatial plans have been completed,29 even though all should have been complet-
ed by 26 April 2010.30 One of the problems in the completion of spatial planning is the need for the approval of 
the plans by the Ministry of Forestry.31 
In the provinces where spatial plans have not been finalised, discrepancy has caused legal uncertainty for the 
licenses/permit/concession holders, particularly in Central Kalimantan Province, Riau Province and Riau Islands 
Province.32 
In addition to forest planning, there are other planning documents that are based on production, such as Area 
for Mining (Wilayah Izin Usaha Pertambangan or WIUP),33 or based on biophysical conditions, such as protected 
or productive peatland area.34 To ensure their integrity, such sectoral maps will require spatial planning at 
provincial and district levels as their primary reference point to determine the function of a site. Finalisation 
of a provincial and district spatial plan is important to ensure all planning documents are harmonised. 
Incompleteness of gazettal of forest areas 
According to the Forestry Act, the gazettal of forests should follow four steps: designation of the forest area, 
demarcation of the forest area boundary, mapping of the forest area, and forest area gazettal.35 In 2012, even 
though 80 per cent of forest areas have had their boundaries marked out and mapped, only 16.6 per cent had 
been gazetted.36 
What is defined as a forest area is important for Indonesian forest management. The problem is that what is 
considered as a forest area in the Forestry Act differs from article to article in the Act. To standardise the 
definition, the Constitutional Court passed decision No 45/PUU-IX/2011.37 
However, standardising the definition has not resolved all issues slowing down the gazettal process. A major 
factor hampering gazettal of a forest area are objections by villagers located in and around a forest area to the 
gazettal. Currently, there are 31,957 villages located in or around the forest areas:38 1305 villages are located 
inside forest areas (4,08%), 7.943 villages (24.86%) are located on the borders of forest areas and 22,709 villag-
es (71.06%) are located around the designated forest areas.39 
Tenure issues 
An important issue in forest governance is clarifying tenure rights. The tenure system creates a bundle of rights 
or a set of rights for certain individuals or groups;40 that is, there is a determination of who has the right to use 
certain resources at certain times. Currently, there are disagreements about who legally has rights and who, in 
fact, is using the resources.41 
There are around 1700 tenure conflicts recorded in Indonesia. The conflicts relate to plantations, forestry and 
mining.42 The main trigger for conflict is a lack of recognition of a community’s land right claims, in particular 
                                                        
29 Ministry of Public Work, Indonesia Spatial Plan Recapitulation Completion Progress (2013) 
<http://sikumtaru.penataanruang.net/view/template.asp?idtipeproduk=Lap&modul=5b1bcc01ae021b8e5f2be71432ab67ac>. 
30 Law No 26/2007 on Spatial Planning, art 78 para 4(c). 
31 Government Regulation No 15/2010 on Implementation of Spatial Planning, art 3. See also, Law No 41/1999 on Forestry, 
art 4(2). 
32 Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Forestry Decree No P.50/Menhut-II/2009 on Status Confirmation and Function of the 
Forest Area, consideration letter (f) (2009). 
33 This is required by Law on Mining No 4/2009 on Mining, Mineral and Coal; WIUP is established to set an area for mining. 
Mining concession in WIUP will be issued based through tender process. 
34 Protected and productive peatlands areas will be established through a government regulation on peatlands, with the final 
draft currently being discussed for finalisation. 
35 Law No 41/1999 on Forestry, art 15 (1) (‘Forestry Act’). 
36 Director General of Forest Planology, Ministry of Forestry, ‘Policy to Accelerate Forest Gazettment’ (Toward Fair and 
Justice Forest Workshop, 13 December 2012). 
37 The decision amended art 1(3) of the Forestry Law No 41/1999, hence the article now reads: ‘Forest Area (Kawasan Hutan) 
is a particular area gazetted (ditetapkan) by the Government to be maintained as permanent forest (Hutan Tetap)’. 
38 Minister of Forestry, Minister of Forestry Regulation No P.51/Menhut-II/2010; Minister of Forestry, Strategic Plan 2010-
2014 (2010). 
39 H Rahmina et al, ‘Ordinances and Procedures of Community Based Forest Management Program in Framework of Law No. 
41/1999’ (December 2011) < http://www.redd-indonesia.org/pdf/Buku_Saku_PHBM_web.pdf>. 
40 James C Ridell, ‘Land Tenure and Agroforestry: A Regional Overview’ in John B Raintree (Ed), Land, Trees and Tenure: 
Proceedings of an International Workshop on Tenure Issue in Agroforestry (ICRAF and Land Tenure Centre, 1987). See also, 
Noor Fauzi, ‘Tenurial Conflicts: That were Created but not Intended to be Settled’ in A Lounela and R Y Zakaria (eds), Land 
Conflict: Perspectives Studies in Campus and Villages (Insist Press, Anthropology Journal of Universitas Indonesia and 
KARSA, 2002). 
41 Noor Fauzi, above n 40. 
42 Agrarian Reform Consortium, Anxiety in Agrarian Intellectual (7 February 2013) <http://www.kpa.or.id/?p=1153>. 
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the claims of vulnerable communities confronting companies who have been issued permits to exploit natural 
resources.43 
In the context of forestry, there are several levels of issues related to the ownership of rights in forest areas. 
On the surface, conflicts arise because licences are issued without considering local conditions, resulting in 
indigenous people and/or the local community losing rights that, generally, have not been formally certified. 
The problem of certification as a proof of recognition of indigenous people and/or local community rights over 
land is the crux tenure conflict. There are many reasons for this problem; above all is the lack of harmony 
among laws and regulations.44 
Constitutional Court Decision No 35/PUU-X/2012 has attempted to resolve this lack of harmony by removing 
the clause that designate indigenous people forest as part of state forest.45 The general impact of this Consti-
tutional Court decision is positive, because it enables indigenous people to claim their tenure rights of a forest 
area. By owning forestland, indigenous people’s rights over the forest will be secured and the opportunity 
arises to implement customary knowledge to protect the forest.46 
Another tenure problem is the limited access that indigenous people and/or local communities have to the 
resources in forest areas. Data from the National Forestry Plan shows overlaps in the utilisation of forest areas 
between corporates and communities. Forest areas that are utilised by businesses for large-scale plantations 
and mining, and transmigration programs, cover 41,032 million ha (98.37%) of forest areas. Forest areas utilised 
by indigenous people and/or local communities (that is, community plantation forests (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat 
or HTR), village forest (hutan desa  or HD) and community forest (hutan kemasyarakatan or HKm)) are 676 
million ha (1.62%) of the total area of the forest that can be utilised.47 The root cause for this issue will be 
discussed below. 
Conclusion of problems and planning a way forward 
In response to the technical and tenure issues highlighted above, several initiatives are currently being imple-
mented to improve governance at planning stage. 
One Map Initiative/Movement  
The One Map Movement aims to create one map as a single reference for all sectors. As explained above, the 
existence of many maps by various government agencies at both the central and regional levels leads to over-
lapping licences being granted and tenure conflicts. Law No 4/2011 on Geospatial Information, Information 
Geospatial Agency (‘Badan Informasi Geospasial’ (‘BIG’)) in combination with UKP4, has initiated the creation 
of one map. 
The One Map Initiative is not merely a project to develop a map using the business-as-usual approach, it aims 
to deliver a map produced through cross-sectoral and central-regional collaboration to break silos and build 
trust. It, therefore, provides a foundation for better natural resources governance and bureaucratic reform, 
and builds upon the existing initiatives of the National Spatial Data Network.  
The One Map Initiative aims to create one reference for basic geospatial information, and one standard for 
thematic mapping-sector(s). The map is a crucial tool to avoid overlapping tenure conflict and to ensure that 
basic data and information is consistent, thus avoiding a lack of harmony between government agencies. It is 
expected that the first basic map will be released for the public by the end of 2013. 
Apart from creating basic maps, the one map movement also aims to have one integrated database of spatial 
and non-spatial information across-sectors, and one geoportal system, including for licences, to ensure public 
transparency and participation. 
                                                        
43 Indonesian Forum for Agrarian Justice, Petition Letter on Settlement of Agrarian Conflict to the President of the Republic 
of Indonesia (7 February 2013) <http://pphafh.ub.ac.id/wrp-con/uploads/2013/02/Petisi-kepada-Presiden-untuk-
Penyelesaian-Konflik-Agraria-.pdf>. 
44 See Arnold Contreras-Hermosilla and Chip Fay, Strengthening Forest Management in Indonesia Through Land Tenure Re-
form: Issues and Framework for Action (2005) <http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_107.pdf>. 
45 The decision amended art 1(6) of the Forestry Law No 41/1999, hence the article now reads: ‘Indigenous Forest [Hutan 
Adat] is Forest located inside indigenous people’s (masyarakat hukum adat) areas. 
46 Tenure right ownership leads to improved forest management because, based on research, land insecurity is a key factor in 
deforestation. See Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay, above n 44. 
47	  Minister	  of	  Forestry,	  Ministry	  of	  Forestry	  Regulation	  No	  P.49/Menhut-­‐II/2011	  on	  Forestry	  Plan	  at	   the	  National	   Level	  Year	  of	  2011-­‐2030	  
(2011).	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Program to promote acceleration of forest area gazettal  
Several institutions have begun to take action to accelerate gazettal of forest areas in order to guarantee legal 
certainty,including the Ministry of Forestry, the REDD+ Task Force and the Corruption Eradication Commission. 
The Ministry of Forestry, in December 2012, issued Regulation No P.44/Menhut-II/2012 on Forest Area 
Gazettement, which replaced Minister of Forestry Regulation No P.50/Menhut-II/2011. This regulation intro-
duces several new aspects, which will ease the process of forest area gazettal, such as the introduction of 
virtual stakes in areas that are inaccessible. There are, however, several technical and strategic matters that 
need to be further regulated – particularly matters to do with transparency, participation and conflict resolu-
tion in the forest gazettal process. The budget for 2013 for forest gazettal has been increased by 300 per cent 
to speed up the gazettal process. The Ministry of Forestry has also established five new Regional Forestry Of-
fices for Planning and Inventory (Balai Pemantapan Kawasan Hutan (BPKH)) located in Banda Aceh Region, Aceh 
Province; Pekan Baru Region, Riau Province; Bandar Lampung Region, Lampung and Bengkulu Province; Pal-
angkaraya Region, Central Kalimantan Province; and Kendari Region, Southeast Sulawesi Province.48 
The REDD+ Task Force has a pilot program at Barito Selatan in Central Kalimantan to study ways of how to best 
achieve transparency, participation and conflict resolution in the process of forest gazettal in the area. It is 
expected that lessons learnt from this pilot project can be included in amending regulations to take into ac-
count these three aspects in the gazettal process. 
The Corruption Eradication Commission (Korupsi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK), in cooperation with 
UKP4/REDD+ Task Force, has initiated the coordination of 12 ministries/institutions to accelerate forest gazet-
tal through a memorandum of understanding (MoU). This program is based on the recognition that, in order to 
accelerate the pace of forest area gazettal, various ministries/institutions need to be involved. The MoU was 
signed on 11 March 2013 by 12 ministries/institutions before the President.49 It was agreed that a detailed 
action plan will be developed and overseen by KPK and UKP4. The MoU recognised that it is necessary to ensure 
synchronisation and harmonisation of laws, regulations and plans, and establish a fair conflict resolution pro-
cesses. The action plan for this MoU currently in the process of development. 
Promoting settlement of tenure conflict through Presidential Instruction 
Early in 2013, the President of the Republic of Indonesia issued Presidential Instruction No 2/2013 on Handling 
National Security Disturbances. The scope of the Presidential Instruction is broad, not only promoting settle-
ment for tenure conflict but also other conflicts which might lead to disturbances in national security. 
The Instruction proposed establishing cooperative mechanisms between central and regional governments, and 
security authorities, including Police Force and Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI), 
to respond and resolve emerging conflicts effectively. This Presidential Instruction has to be read together 
with Law No 7/2012 on Social Conflict Management. A major development arising from this new law and the 
policy is that there will be one specific task force responsible for identifying and helping to resolve conflicts. 
The Social Conflict Management Task Force (Satuan Tugas Penyelesaian Konflik Sosial) should operate across 
all levels of government: central, provincial and region/city, in the event that there is no customary institution 
(pranata adat) or social institution (pranata sosial) to deal with the conflict. It should be noted that there are 
many reservations regarding the Presidential Instruction, particularly concerning the approach for solving 
social conflict through repressive means, with an emphasis on the role of the security authority.50 
Government regulation draft on swamp and peatlands management  
One of Indonesia’s important assets, from the natural resources perspective, is its vast areas of peatlands. 
Unfortunately, the area peatlands decreases significantly year-by-year. It is recorded that in 1981 Indonesia 
had a land area of 26.5 million ha of peat. By 2004 the peatland area had decreased to approximately 20.6 
                                                        
48	  Ministry	  of	  Forestry,	  Ministry	  of	  Forestry	  Regulation	  No	  P.16/Menhut-­‐II/2013	  on	  Organization	  and	  Management	  of	  BPKH,	  2013.	  
49 The 12 Ministries/Institutions are: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Planning/National Development Planning Agency, National Land Agency, the National Geospatial 
Information and National Human Rights Commission. 
50 See, Tempo.co, Presidential Instruction on Conflict Resolution is not a way to resolve agrarian conflict, (7 February 2013) 
<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/02/07/078459817/Inpres-Kamnas-Bukan-Solusi-Konflik-Agraria>; See also, vhr-
media.com, President shall revoke Presidential Instruction on Conflict Resolution (22 February 2013) 
<http://www.vhrmedia.com/new/berita_detail.php?id=1677>. 
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million ha. Based on the latest data held by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2011, only 14.09 million ha of 
pealands remain. The loss of peatlands from 1981 to 2011 is about 12 million ha. 
In the context of reducing GHG emission, peatlands have a very important function, because they store large 
amounts of carbon. Because of their crucial role in capturing carbon as well as providing other environmental 
services, special arrangements regarding the protection and preservation of peatlands are needed. There are 
two draft government regulations currently being discussed to deal with this issue. The first is a draft on the 
protection and management of ecosystems of peatland (Peatland Draft) based on the initiative of Ministry of 
Environment. The second is a draft government regulation on swamps (Swamp Draft) based on an initiative of 
the Ministry of Public Works. 
These two drafts will regulate a number of crucial issues, including providing an operational definition of peat-
land to ensure one reference for peatland mapping. Another important aspect is the introduction of emissions 
as criteria for designating a protected area and productive area in peatlands. In addition, the criteria for peat-
lands damage in each area will be regulated. 
Currently, the Swamp Draft is in State Secretariat while the Peatland Draft has been returned to the Ministry 
of Environment for further improvement. The regulation of peatlands focuses the attention of policy makers on 
this type of ecosystem – something that has rarely occurred. 
Issues related to forest and peatlands utilisation  
The issue of licenses that violate the law  
Problems with the issue of licences include overlapping licenses; and licenses, including in forest areas, that do 
not conform to legal procedures. The Ministry of Forestry, for example, released data that shows that there are 
749 plantation licenses covering around 8.5 million ha and 1727 mining licenses covering around 8.9 million ha 
of forest areas in eight provinces (Central Kalimantan Province, East Kalimantan Province, West Kalimantan 
Province, North Sumatera Province, Riau Province, Jambi Province and West Java Province) that do not con-
form to legal procedures.51 The Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK))52 also found that 
plantation and mining licenses inside Central Kalimantan forest areas have been operated without proper li-
cences from the Ministry of Forestry. 
The issue of licenses that violate the law has several causes:53 
1. The procedures for the issues of licenses are not integrated across sectors and levels of government. 
2. There is a lack of equity and fairness protocols to discourage regional governments from issuing new li-
censes that will effect forest areas. 
3. Legislation which tends to give considerable discretion to the license issuer. 
4. Weak forest governance organisations in terms of capacity to monitor and control the issue of licenses. 
5. Weak governance in the licensing process including complicated procedures, lack of transparency and 
public participation and corrupt practices. 
6. Weak compliance and law enforcement so that unlawful practices continue to spread between license 
granters and business agents. 
Lack of transparency, public participation and synchronisation 
The problems surrounding the licensing process is significantly affected by the complexity of government bu-
reaucracy, leaving the the licensing process vulnerable to corruption.54 Since the establishment of the KPK, 
there have been at least six forestry sector corruption cases, revealing the different sectors of the forest gov-
ernance system that are prone to corruption, including licensing, administration and forestry development 
planning.55 
                                                        
51 Director of Investigation and Forest Security, Ministry of Forestry, Monitoring and Law Enforcement in Forest and Peatlands, 
in Focus Group Discussion on Legislation Reform of Forest and Peatlands Laws and Regulation, 27-28 February 2013. 
52 BPK, ‘Second Semester Examination Result’ (Report TA 2008 No 36/LHP/XVII/02/2009, Central Kalimantan, 23 February 
2009). 
53 ICEL and Kemitraan, Intergrated License Toward Forest Governance Reform in Indonesia: Central Kalimantan Case Study, 
(2012). See also, Commission Eradication Commission, Corruption Impact Assessment: Corruption in the Presence of Weak 
Legal Certainty (2010).  
54 Tina Soreide, ‘Forest Concession and Corruption’ (2007) 3, U4 Issue. 
55 Anti Forest Mafia Coalition, ‘Initial Performance Evaluation of Corruption Eradication Commission in Combating Corruption 
in the Forestry Sector: Corruption Eradication in Forestry Sector is not completed!’ (Press Release, 2012). The largest case 
is Tengku Azmun v Suwarna Abdul Fattah. 
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A reason for the proliferation of corruption in the forestry sector is the high profits that can be earned by 
perpetrators, and the low penalties and sanctions for committing the crimes. One corruption case involving the 
issue of a licence on forest land revealed that the perpetrator gained 1.2 trillion IDR (approximately US $120 
million) and caused massive natural forest and environment degradation.56 Studies show that there are poten-
tial losses to the State of around US $2 billion a year from such cases.57 This is an alarming figure because State 
revenues from the forestry sector are only around 1.3 trillion IDR (approximately US $130 million) per year.58 
There are several theories to explain the corruption in the forestry sector. One theory is that there is asym-
metrical information regarding forest governance caused by the complexity of the bureaucracy and lack of 
regulations coordinating different agencies.59 The complexity of the bureaucracy also impacts upon the type 
information passed from principal to agent to client. When convoluted and unsupported by effective regula-
tions to manage coordination, information can be changed and opened up to corruption. For example, the 
absence of adequate mechanisms to reconcile revenues obtained by the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the central and regional governments opens the way for corruption.60 The process of timber ad-
ministration is highly complex, involving many documents and many agencies: a list of forest products must be 
drawn up, logging and timber products reports need to be made, timber validity certificates need to be made 
and logs transportation report kept. All these reports and certificates need to be reported to the Regional 
Forest Service, summarised by the Regent, and then summarised again by the Governor. This complexity is very 
difficult to supervise. The problem is worsened when supervision over timber management itself does not work 
consistently. 
Problems also occur in the implementation of regulations that govern transparency. Inaccessible information 
related to forestry data and information, such as decisions on licensing of forest products or allocations of 
forest areas, have impaired the ability of the public to oversee the Government’s forest governance system. 
Lack of transparency has created loopholes and discretion for corruption. Corruption in the licensing process 
can lead to arbitrariness in the issue of licenses, resulting in, not only the destruction of forests, but also the 
seizure of lands nominally belonging to other parties, leading to land conflict. The issue of corruption becomes 
more complex when officers who should be at the front line to combat forest crime are involved in the crime, 
as revealed in the case of illegal logging in Ketapang in 2008.61 
Another theory of corruption put forward by Klitgaard is that a lack of accountability can trigger corruption. 
Lack of accountability can be connected to monopoly power and high discretion.62 Klitgaard explains that mo-
nopoly power and discretion without accountability in bureaucratic structures provides incentives for 
corruption. In the licensing regime for plantations, lincences are given by different levels of government de-
pending on the location of plantations. Most licences are located in regional areas, hence the licensing process 
is under the authority of the Regional Government; there is no capacity for the community to comment on the 
issue of the licence and there is no obligation on the Regent to report on the reasons for the issue of the li-
cence to the Ministry of Agriculture. The result is issues of overlapping business licenses for hundreds of units 
and millions of hectares of forest areas without the Central Government knowing about it.63 
Incomplete decentralisation in Indonesia also creates opportunity for corruption. This situation occurs when the 
duty is conferred to care for a resource without the necessary authority to manage the resources, giving rise to 
ambiguity and legal uncertainty,64 and a loss of control and role clarity.65  
                                                        
56 Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supreme Court Decision No 736K/Pid.Sus/2009, 2009. 
57 Human Rights Watch, Wild Money: The Human Rights Consequences of Illegal Logging and Corruption in Indonesia’s Fore-
stry Sector (2009) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports /indonesia1209webwcover.pdf>. Human Rights Watch, 
using industry standard methodology, estimated that the Indonesia government lost an average of almost US $2 billion an-
nually between 2003 and 2006 due to illegal logging, corruption, and mismanagement. 
58 Kontan, Forestry Sector Non-Tax State Revenues 1.3 Trillion Rupiah, 15 July 2010 
<http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/sektor-hutan-setor-pnbp-rp-13-triliun-1, 15 July 2010>. 
59 Johann Lambsdorff, ‘How Corruption Affects Public Welfare – A Review of Theories’ (Discussion paper 9, Center for Global-
ization and Europeanization of the Economy, 2001). 
60 Doddy Sukadri, Bambang Widiyantoro and Herman Prayudi, ‘An Analysis of Government Policy in the Context of Accelerat-
ing Natural Forest Management for Sustainable Production’ (Pengelolaan Hutan Alam Produksi Lestari (PHAPL)) 
achievement (The International Tropical Timber Organization dan Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia, 2009). 
61 Hukum Online, Illegal Logging Law Enforcement Enters into a New Round, (25 April 2008) 
<http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol19093/function.require>. 
62 Robert Klitgaard, ‘Healing Sick Institutions’ in Silvio Borner and Martin Paldam (eds), The Political Dimension of Economic 
Growth, (Macmillan for the International Economic Association, 1998). 
63 This has been admitted by the Ministry of Agriculture on many occasions, eg in the Workshop on integrated licensing mech-
anism held by REDD+ Task Force on 13 August 2012 in Le Meridien Hotel, Jakarta Indonesia. 
64 Subadi, Forest Land Tenure and Utilization, (Prestasi Pustaka, 2010). 
65 Herbert Kaufman, Red Tapes: Its Origins, Uses and Abuses (Brooking Institution, 1977). 
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Whatever the reasons, when corruption occurs, the functions of government become paralysed, creating the 
impression that the government is incapable of undertaking its mandate. It is difficult for regional governments 
to conduct supervision of the timber business if officials are being bribed. Legal officers will also find it diffi-
cult to enforce the law if State Officials are partners in the crime. In such context, Lambsdorff explains, 
corruption could be the root of the problem or the symptom of poor governance. There exist reciprocal flows 
between poor governance and corruption.66 Klitgaard warns that when corruption has become systemic, eradi-
cation actions through training, regulations complexity reduction and privatisation are no longer sufficient; 
instead shocks to the system will be necessary.67 
Challenges in achieving sustainable forest management 
One of the triggers of deforestation and forest degradation is unsustainable forest management activities. One 
of the conditions for licenses holders is to comply with technical regulations. However, in reality, many activi-
ties ignore the license conditions. 
An independent assessment agency undertook an assessment of the performance of sustainable forest yield in 
the period of 2002 to 2009. The result shows that 45 per cent of the total of 204 companies with licenses to 
utilise timber from forest in natural forest performed poorly.68 Furthermore, various cases related to forest 
management have shown that companies are still using destructive practices, including logging beyond the 
annually allocated areas, logging that exceeds the quota, accepting timbers from illegal logging, refusing to 
conduct silviculture required for the management unit, refusing to conduct enrichment practices, providing 
fictitious information, and refusing to conduct border management. Because enforcement is rarely present, 
there is incentive to exploit the work area destructively. 
Those companies attempting to operate in good faith do not obtain market advantages but are still subject to 
the high cost of operating in the wood products distribution system.69 
Limitation of public access 
In order to accommodate public access to forests, the Ministry of Forestry has implemented a scheme of com-
munity-based forest management (pengelolaan hutan berbasis masyarakat) for community forests (hutan 
rakyat or HR),70 village forests (hutan desa  or HD), community forest (hutan kemasyarakatan or HKM),71 and 
community plantation forests (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat or HTR). However, there are problems with this scheme 
because the community, particularly indigenous people, want to have full authority to manage their forest and 
protect their ownership. This is complicated because the Forestry Law considers forests occupied by indigenous 
people as state forests. Thus, the access of the indigenous people is restricted by a licensing process. As has 
been discussed above, the Constitutional Court decision has attempted to resolve this problem72 but the im-
plementation of the decision is crucial for ensuring that the rights of indigenous people to the forest are 
acknowledged. 
Another problem with the public access scheme is the bureaucratic complexity for the community. There is a 
lack of clear boundaries for land allocated under the three land access categories. Clarity should mean that 
there are no competing rights under government licences to the forest. The rights of indigenous people are 
hampered because the existing regulations do not yet technically give management rights to the indigenous 
community. 
                                                        
66 Johann Lambsdorff, How Corruption Affect Public Welfare (Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, 
2001). 
67 Robert Klitgaard, ‘Healing Sick Institutions’ in Silvio Borner and Martin Paldam (Eds), The Political Dimension of Economic 
Growth (Macmillan for the International Economic Association, 1998). 
68 Forest Watch Indonesia, Portraits of Indonesia Forest 2000-2009 (2011). 
69 See, Harianterbit.com, 70 Companies in Forestry Sector are Under Bankruptcy Threat, 
http://www.harianterbit.com/2012/09/21/70-perusahaan-kehutanan-terancam-bangkrut/,21 September 2012. See also, 
Suaramerdeka.com, Asmindo Reject Timber Legality Certification, <http://suaramerdeka.com/v1/index.php/read/cetak/ 
2012/02/11/176805/Asmindo-Tolak-Sertifikasi-Legalitas-Kayu>, 11 February 2012. 
70 Community Forest (hutan rakyat or HR) is given in Private Forest (Hutan Hak). Private Forest is an area that qualifies as a 
forest but private rights might be given <Minister of Forestry, Ministry of Forestry Regulation No P.03/2004 on Community 
Forest Guideline (Hutan Rakyat)>. 
71 Community Forest (hutan kemasyarakatan or HKM) is given in State Forest (Hutan Negara). State Forest is an area where 
there are no private rights over the area <Minister of Forestry, Ministry of Forestry Regulation No P.52/Menhut-II/2011 on 
Community Forest (Hutan Kemasyarakatan)>. 
72 The Case No 35/PUU-IV/2012 brought by the Alliance of Indigenous People (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN)) to 
conduct judicial review of art 1(6), 4(3), 5(1-4), 50(2), 67. See above n 45-46. 
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Although the Central Government has agreed to provide rights to the community, there is a lack of will on the 
part of most regional governments.73 Even should land be available, communities often lack the capacity to 
access the licensing process, nor do existing regulations support building the capacity of the community to 
access forest resources. At the provincial level, some provinces have passed enabling regulations to establish 
and protect the rights of indigenous or local communities and business agents. For example, Aceh Province has 
regulations on forestry; Papua Province has regional regulations for the protection and management of forest 
resources by the indigenous community; and Central Kalimantan Province has regulations on forest products 
and forest area utilisation, institutions of Dayak,74 customary laws and customary rights over customary lands. 
However, the laws lack operational regulations to support the establishment and protection of the communi-
ty’s rights, in particular the rights of indigenous and local communities to manage the forest and land.75 
The way forward 
Several programs have been initiated to respond to the issues discussed above. 
Improving governance of licensing process 
There are many factors needed in a licensing mechanism to ensure it serves its purpose: transparency, partici-
pation, accountability, harmonisation and simplicity. The current licensing system needs to be be modified to 
ensure harmonised licensing procedures for plantation and mining in forest areas, facilitate information mana-
gement and strengthen disclosure, facilitate public participation, strengthen supervision, and reduce 
opportunities for corruption. 
In order to integrate the licensing process in line with the duties, functions and authority of each agency, it is 
necessary to have a legal policy. At the moment there is a policy on One Door Integrated Licensing (Perizinan 
Terpadu Satu Pintu (‘PTSP’)) based on Minister of Internal Affairs Decree No 24/2006 on Guidelines of One 
Door Integrated System Implementation. To ensure the effective implementation of this policy, Presidential 
Instruction No 1/2013 on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption has set various action plans. The same 
instruction also lay down action plans related to transparency and utilisation of information technology, for 
example on mining permits. 
At the project level, the REDD+ Task Force/UKP4 is initiating and preparing an information management system 
(IMS) prototype. The prototype will be tested in several regions of Central Kalimantan Province such as Barito 
Selatan, Kota Waringin Timur and Kapuas. The IMS provides facilities for centrally collecting and managing 
concession data including mining, plantation and forestry licences. Such data can be used nationally to prepare 
plans and programs; for licensing purposes, it can reduce the chance of licences overlapping; and at the en-
forcement level, the data is important to conduct due diligence and enable law enforcement at the 
administrative or at the criminal enforcement stage. In addition to the Central Kalimantan project, a licence 
review process is also being conducted in East Kalimantan. Early in 2013, the Governor of East Kalimantan 
issued a letter to halt the issue of licenses for mining, plantation and forestry activities in East Kalimantan till 
the license review is completed.76 
The amendment to Minister of Agriculture Regulation No 26/Permentan/OT.140/2/2007 on Guidelines of 
Plantation License (‘MOA Regulation on Guidelines of Plantation License’), currently underway, will Impact the 
plantation sector. This regulation has a strategic role to provide standards for plantation licensing. As already 
noted, under regional autonomy and plantation laws, the head of the regional government (Regent) allocates 
plantation licenses. Among the issues being discussed in the amendment process of the MOA Regulation on 
Guidelines of Plantation Licese are setting limitations on the land ownership of groups of companies, clarifying 
and detailing plans and partnership regulations, improving transparency in the licensing process and 
introducing second-line administrative oversight by the central government. The upcoming amendment is also 
expected to clarify the obligations of operators to obtain cultivation rights prior to beginning work. This is 
                                                        
73 Kemitraan, Planning and Budgeting Toward Community Based Forest Management in Indonesia (2012) 
<http://www.kemitraan.or.id/uploads_file/20130131070905.studi%20perencanaan%20dan%20penganggaran%20CBFM.pdf>. 
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74 Dayak Tribes are the indigenous people of Kalimantan. See Rhett A Butler, The People of Borneo (12 June 2013) 
<http://www.mongabay.com/borneo/borneo_people.html>. 
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different from existing regulations which are not clear on this matter. Many companies have been reported to 
have started their operations even before cultivation rights have been obtained. 
Supervision and law enforcement 
Supervision of activities in forests and peatlands by central and regional government is mandatory.77 One of the 
most important aspects of supervision is the active involvement of the community. Law No 14/2008 on Public 
Access to Information and Law No 25/2009 on Public Services guarantee the general principles of transparency 
in supervision as well as minimum standards for the public complaint mechanism. At the operational level, only 
a small number of ministries/agencies and regional governments have implemented procedures for supervision 
and dealing with community complaints. Only the National Police Department has regulations determining the 
handling of community complaints (Head of National Police Regulation No 2/2012 on Public Complaints Han-
dling Mechanism). Ministries such as the Attorney Generals Office and the Ministry of Forestry have not yet 
issued regulations related to mechanism for dealing with community complaints as instructed by Law on Public 
Service.78 There is no obligation to provide feedback to those who have filed a complaint, or to increase the 
capacity of the community to play an effective role in forests and peatlands supervision. 
Other weakly regulated matters are mechanisms to follow-up findings of corruption in forests and peatlands 
management. Nor is there a mechanism for central governments to supervise regional governments in manag-
ing, protecting and supervising forest areas.79 
On the other hand, regulations concerning law enforcement (administrative, civil and criminal) are already 
adequate, although there are weaknesses in their enforcement.80 The annual reports of the Supreme Court 
shows that a small number of cases related to forestry were submitted to the Supreme Court, and minimum 
penalties given for each crime. In 2009, there were 106 cases: 11 per cent had ‘not guilty’ verdicts, 24 per 
cent had ‘guilty’ verdicts and sentenced to less than a year’s imprisonment, and 75 per cent were found guilty 
and sentenced to between one and five years. In 2010 there were 66 cases: 9 per cent had ‘not guilty’ verdicts, 
24 per cent were sentenced to less than a year imprisonment, and 67 per cent were sentenced to between one 
and five years imprisonment. In 2011, there were 42 cases on forestry: 14 per cent had not guilty verdicts, 29 
per cent were sentenced to less than a year imprisonment, and 57 per cent were sentenced to between one 
and five years.81 The number of cases of forestry being handled by the Supreme Court is decreasing, while 
cases related to forestry are reported to be increasing due to concessions overlapping. 
The causes of ineffective supervision and law enforcement include: 
1. Lack of clarity of the status of the forest area. This uncertainty results in difficulties in enforcing the 
law in forest areas. 
2. Ineffective offence formulation and sanctions. The majority of criminal offences require proof of the is-
sue of a licence from the Ministry of Forestry and knowledge about the status of the forest area. This 
situation has created izin terbang, meaning false licences (literally means flying licenses) where a li-
cence is issued at the time when a crime is being investigated.82   
3. Use of conventional evidentiary mechanisms Despite the existence of a general clause in Law No 
11/2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction, electronic evidence such as emails (electronic 
mail), wiretaps, cellular phone data etc are generally perceived as not legitimate in criminal cases in-
cluding forestry cases.83 However, forestry criminals use such technologies and, thus, it is essential for 
courts to consider allowing the utilisation of electronic evidence.84 
4. Poor capacity and coordination between law enforcers. Due to the nature of forestry crime, forestry 
cases require good coordination between relevant agencies, such as between police and prosecutor. 
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However, due to reasons, including limitation of infrastructure and facilities, different points of view 
and institutional ego coordination is, in some cases, difficult to achieve. In addition, law enforcement 
on forestry and peatland requires specific expertise, which many law enforcers do not possess.85 
5. Corruption. Poor law enforcement in the forestry sector is also caused by practices of a ‘judicial mafia’ 
in the law enforcement process.86 
6. Poor transparency and accountability in supervision and law enforcement. This causes poor public con-
trol. Neglect by the community to use its capacity to be involved in supervision of forestry activities and 
law enforcement has also become a problem. 
In response to these problems of supervision and law enforcement, two initiatives are being implemented:87 
1. Guideline to handle cases by using a ‘multi-door’ approach; and 
2. Corporate crimes prosecution guideline. 
In addition there are programs to combat corruption in the law enforcement sector through Presidential In-
struction No 1/2013 on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption. 
Guidelines for cases handling by using multi-door approach 
Illegal activities in forests and on peatlands, for example, illegal logging or forest fires, happens because of 
various motives. Whether it is to benefit from logging or obtain the land for other use, such as planttaion or 
mining, the motivation is to gain financial benefits through illegal means. The environmental and social costs 
and state financial loss (including the loss of the potential income from tax) from illegal practices are 
enormous; crimes in the foresty and natural resources sector are multi-sectoral crimes. Thus, they require a 
‘multi-door’ approach to remove incentives, to ensure perpretators can be sued and suitably punished, 
including responsibility for restoring the ecological and economic loss resulting from their crimes. The multi-
door approach uses law enforcement based on implementation of criminal sanctions contained in a 
combination of various legislation, such as environment, forestry, spatial, plantation, mining, taxation, 
corruption and money laundering criminal acts, related to the environment and natural resources in forests and 
peatlands. 
The criteria that need to be considered in implementing the multi-door approach are any one or combination 
of: 
1. Indications of violation in a licensing process. For example, issuing plantation licences without 
conducting an environmental impact assessment or obtaining an environmental permit. 
2. Indications of activities exceeding the permit or carried out without a permit. Examples include mining 
or plantation activity outside a concession area. 
3. Indications of crimes being committed in ecologically vulnerable areas, for example in conservation 
areas, protected areas and deep peatlands. 
4. Indication of the loss of the state’s resources or loss of state’s income. for example, corporations that 
undertake land clearing without paying the necessary taxes or abiding by certain provisions. 
Using the multi-door approach has benefits:  
1. Preventing criminal perpetrators from escaping because of limitations in a legislation’s scope. 
2. Making sure that the perpetrators are cautious about conducting similar crimes. This is particularly 
relevant in relation to criminal syndicates. 
3. Promoting comprehensive responsibility and creating deterrent effects through requiring corporations to 
return state money and restore degraded environments. 
4. Facilitating international cooperation, in particular, chasing assets and suspects, and gaining 
cooperation related to criminal acts by the utilisation of anti-money laundering or anti corruption laws. 
5. Maximising the process of reimbursing the state for its losses, including from the tax sector. 
In ensuring the utilisation of this approach, the Guidance to Handle Criminal Acts Related to 
Environment/Natural Resources in the Forest and Peatland by Using Multidoor Approach was recently issued.88 
The Guidance was prepared jointly by the Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Living Environment, Ministry of 
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Finance, Attonery General, Police Department of Republic of Indonesia, and Indonesian Financial Transaction 
Reports and Analysis Center. 
The guidelines details the coordination mechanisms that are important in using multi-door approach. Two 
aspects of the guidelines are the coordination of law enforcement in the multi-door approach, and the 
investigation and inquiry phase up to the prosecution phase. 
Apart from being useful for providing instructions for how to handle criminal acts through the use of the multi-
door approach, the guidelines will function as one of the documents for training in the multi-door approach. 
Guidelines for arranging indictments and the evidentiary technique for corporate crimes 
In handling criminal matters in the area of environment and natural resources, the issue of corporate crime is 
central. Corporate crime prosecution is expected to send not only field actors but also intellectual actors to 
court. In this way, the deterrent effect will be more effective and environment rehabilitation can be forced 
upon the holders of capital. 
The REDD+ Task Force, supported by the Attorney General Office and the Supreme Court, are studying this 
issue with a view to providing the necessary technical guidelines on corporate criminal liability. 
Concluding remarks 
The Government of Indonesia is committed, nationally and internationally, to address the issue of deforesta-
tion and forest degradation. Tackling the issue of deforestation and forest degradation is a long and complex 
processes. It should be acknowledged that the Government of Indonesia has made considerable progress in 
addressing governance challenges. The highlight of the commitment has been encapsulated by the Presidential 
Instruction No 6/2013 on Suspension of New Licenses and Improving Governance of Primary Forest and Peat-
land, which mandates related ministries and agencies to implement concrete actions to improve forests and 
peatlands governance. 
In Indonesia, REDD+ should be used as an entry point to protect Indonesia’s forests and to promote significant 
governance reform in natural resources management. Major challenges that confront Indonesia's REDD+ agenda 
are to ensure high-level political support that is fully translated into state policies and actions. The establish-
ment of the operational wings of REDD+, namely the REDD+ Agency, the MRV Institute and Funding Instrument 
and other relevant agencies is fundamental to guaranteeing openness, participation and accountability in deci-
sion-making and implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia. 
